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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RECIDIVISTS:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN TORT AND CRIME
Wayne A. Logan*
I. INTRODUCTION
For much of modem American legal history, a line has divided the
civil and criminal justice systems, demarcating private and public law.
In recent years, however, this line has become less distinct as a result of
the aggressive expansion of the criminal law into domains previously
regulated by civil law I and the rapid proliferation of quasi-criminal civil
sanctions.2 The blurred boundaries, in turn, have raised constitutional
concern, especially with regard to perceived erosions in procedural
protections afforded individuals caught in this legal netherworld'
Taken together, these developments have been said to reflect "the trend
towards the civilization of the criminal law and the criminalization of
the civil law."'
More longstanding in existence, but no less indicative of a civil-
criminal convergence, are punitive damage awards,5 imposed on
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College ofLaw. Special thanks to Markus Dubber, Richard
Frase, Stuart Green, Pam Karlan, David Logan, Richard Murphy, Mark Rosen, Catherine Sharkey, and
Ron Wright forcommcnts and suggestions; Meg Daniel for editorial assistance; and Sarah Boswell-Healey
for research support.
1. See, e.g.,John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawjul" Mlean "Criminal'?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction inAmerican Law, 71 B.U.L. REV'. 193 (1991); Stuart P. Green, Why It'sa Crinme to Tear
the Tag OffaMaUress: Overciminalzation andtkeAloralContentofegultory Offenses, 46 EM ORYLJ. 1533 (1997);
Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Fortune and the Cnminaization ofMass Torts, 96 MICH. L REV. 1121(1998).
2. See NancyJ. King, Portioning Pnishment. Constitutional Limits on Successive and Evcessive Penalties, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 101, 103 (1995) (noting that "[t] here has been a remarkable increase during the last decade
in the imposition of overlapping civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions for the same misconduct, as
well as a steady rise in the severity of those sanctions"(footnote omitted)); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Cil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Ciil law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992) (noting that
"[p]unitive civil sanctions are replacing a significant part of the criminal law in critical areas").
3. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
4. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" a  Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 289,297 (1998); seealso Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civilemedies toAchieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Lenw Distinction, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1325, 1325
(1991) (noting that "[tjoday, the distinction between criminal and civil law seems to be collapsing across
a broad front"); Christopher Slobogin, The Civiliation of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2005) (noting that "[t] he boundaries of the criminal justice system are eroding").
5. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed.
1984) (observing that "[t]he idea of punishment, or of discouraging other offenses, usually does not enter
into tort law"; it is only in the "anomalous" realm of punitive damages that "the ideas underlying the
criminal law have invaded the field of torts").
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individuals and entities for aggravated tortious misconduct. 6 According
to the U.S. Supreme Court, punitive damages are "an expression of
moral condemnation"7 awarded "to further the aims of the criminal law:
'to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.""
Moreover, like criminal sanctions, punitive damages have come to be
viewed as a means to address "public wrongs,"9 as evidenced in the
emergence of "split recovery" statutes whereby a set portion of the puni-
tive damages award is allocated to the government treasury."0 With
punitive awards being allocated to the public fisc, the distinction
between punitive damages and criminal fines appears to have been
eroded altogether. 1
6. Seeid. §2, at9-10:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances ofaggravation or outrage, such as spite or "malice,"
or a fraudulent evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate
disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called willful or wanton.
(footnotes omitted).
7. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
8. Browning-Ferris Indus, v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003)
(noting that punitives "serve the same purposes as criminal penalties"); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (stating that punitives are "imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence").
Although "punishment" and "retribution" are often used interchangeably, the latter term more specifically
reflects the intended purpose: to sanction misconduct, in proportion to the offender's culpability. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETiHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414-20 (1978); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBIJTY: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 231, 233-34 (1968).
9. See. e.g., Kirkland v. Midland Mortgage Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1280 (1 th Cir. 2001) (punitives
serve "the collective good by deterring a public wrong and punishing egregious wrongdoing"); Chrysler
Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986) (punitives are imposed to redress a "public wrong");
Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1991) (punitives "are awarded to punish the
wrongdoer for the wrong committed upon society"); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put
Options in the Alass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 749, 817 (2002) (observing that "[u%]ithin the
panoply of tort damages, the punitive damages remedy is unique: only a thin doctrinal thread ties it to
individual plaintiffs"); Theodore B. Olson & TheodoreJ. Boutrous,Jr., ConstitutionalRestraints on theDoctrine
ofPunitiveDarmges, 17 PEPP. L REV. 907, 918 (1990) (noting that a punitive damages award is imposed "for
purposes of retribution and deterrence by a system which simultaneously compensates the victim for his
injury, and punishes the defendant for the wrong done to society by his conduct").
10. Today, eight states have such laws. See Victor A. Schwartz et al., I'll Take 77a" LegalandPublic
Polity Problems Raised by Statutes that Require Punitive Damages Awards to Be Shared lith the State, 68 MO. L. REV.
525, 334-38 (2003). In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court recently assumed responsibility to assess whether
some portion of a punitive award should be directed to "a place that will achieve a societal good." See
Dardingerv. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146 (Ohio 2002). According to the court,
"[a]t the punitive-damages level, it is the societal element that is most important. The plaintiff remains a
party, but the de facto party is our society, and the jury is deciding whether and to what extent we as a
society should punish the defendant." Id. at 145.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cnt. A (1977) (distinguishing punitive damages
and criminal Flines on the basis that with the former the injured individual receives damages, not the state).
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Viewed in their totality, the aforementioned developments provide
compelling evidence of a reversion to a time when tort and crime were
united,'2 and public and private law defied ready distinction.' 3  This
Essay, however, examines an area of the law that highlights the con-
tinued existence of a distinct civil-criminal divide: the differing con-
sideration given extraterritorial misconduct in the assessment of punitive
damage awards and criminal sentences. Although both sanctions are
justified on retribution and deterrence grounds,'4 and governed by the
tenet that repeated wrongdoing justifies increased culpability,' 5 they
have come to regard extraterritorial wrongdoing quite differently. The
sentences of criminal offenders are enhanced without regard for whether
their prior offenses occurred outside the forum state.' 6 Meanwhile, as
made clear in the Supreme Court's recent 6-3 decision in State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance v. Campbell, 7 extraterritorial wrongdoing is per-
mitted to play a very limited role, if any, in the formulation of punitive
damage awards imposed on tortfeasors.
After first exploring the inconsistent treatment given extraterritorial
misconduct in the sanctioning of tort and crime, this Essay examines the
purported justifications for the contrast. Chief among these is the notion
that states have no cognizable interest in tortfeasors' wrongdoing outside
their borders and that to permit consideration of such wrongdoing
would violate principles of federalism and comity. Such a view, how-
ever, is at marked odds with the reality that sentencing courts routinely
take account of extraterritorial criminal misconduct, which by unavoid-
able implication involves application of other states' laws. Likewise,
judicial concern that civil defendants will lack notice and perhaps face
12. See OLIER W HOLiES, TIE COMxMON LAW 44 (1881) ("[T] he general principles of criminal
and civil liability are the same."); JAMsIES F1TZJAMES STEPHEN, GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAN-D 2 (1863) ("Nearly every crime is not only a crime, but is also an individual wrong or tort.");
David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Lean, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1996)
(noting shared historic commonalities).
13. See MortonJ. Horwitz, The Histoy ofthe Publis/PhlvateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424
(1982) (noting that "only in the nineteenth century was the public/private distinction brought to the center
of the stage in American legal and political theory"); see also Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages:
Beond the Public/Prwate Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1079 (1989).
14. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. This is not to say that retribution and deterrence
are the only goals of the respective sanctions, rather that they are the principal ones. See Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (noting other criminal law goals such as incapacitation but
describing retribution and deterrence as the "two primary objectives"); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Faimess and
Efficiency in the Law of unitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3, 12 (1982) (identifying seven possible goals
of punitive damages but spccifying retribution and deterrence as the primary goals); see also LINDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PJN1TTVF DAMACES § 1.4(B) (4th ed. 2000) (noting that in all but
three states punitive damages are awarded for purposes of retribution and deterrence).
15. See infra notes 45, 81 and accompanying text.
16. See inia notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
17. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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"multiple punishments" if extraterritorial misconduct is considered in
setting punitive damage awards, stands in sharp contrast to criminal
recidivist laws, which afford jurisdictions broad discretion to enhance
sentences based on extraterritorial misconduct and have been immune
to double jeopardy challenges.
Finally, but no less important, the embrace of such distinct views on
extraterritoriality highlights the existence of fundamentally different
understandings of tort and crime culpability. In State Farm, the Court
conceived of tort culpability in narrow geographic terms, with punitive
damages being treated much more as a private remedy tied to the parti-
cular harm suffered by the individual in-state tort victim. By contrast,
in Ewing v. California,8 decided a month before State Farm, the Court
rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to California's draconian
"three strikes" recidivist law, emphasizing that criminal culpability is to
be assessed in terms of an offender's entire recidivism history, which
commonly entails extraterritorial wrongdoing.
In short, like reports of Mark Twain's death, the purported demise of
the civil-criminal distinction has been exaggerated. 9 It remains alive
and well in the sanctioning of civil and criminal recidivists.
II. RECIDIVISM IN TORT AND CRIME
A. Punitive Damage Awards
Punitive damage awards trace their Anglo-American origins back to
mid-eighteenth century England.2" Juries then had "it in their power to
give damages for more than the injury received ... as a punishment to
the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a
proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."21 In 1851, the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the availability of punitive damages as
"a well-established principle of the common law."22  Today, the
18. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
19. JOHN' BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 528 (16th ed. 1992) (recounting that late in his life
Twain is said to have dispatched a telegram to reporters proclaiming that the "report of my death was an
exaggeration").
20. See Ellis, supra note 14, at 12-15 (citing and discussing Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ct.
Com. Pl. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rcp. 768 (Ct. Com. P1. 1763)). Prior thereto, mention of
punitive damage awards appeared in the Code of Hammurabi, Roman law, and the Bible. See Howard A.
Denermark, Seek Greater Fairness WhenAwardingAultiplePlaintiffsPunitiveDmagesforaSigleAct by a Defendant,
63 OHIO ST. LJ. 931, 934 (2002).
21- I,'ks, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
22. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 371 (1851).
t612
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overwhelming majority of U.S. jurisdictions permit punitive awards23
based upon defendants' willful, malicious, aggravated misconduct, or
the reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others. 4
Until recently, punitive awards remained relatively uncontroversial,
despite occasional judicial condemnation.2" However, prompted by
reports of an "explosion" in excessive judgments,26 and the empirical
reality of increasing numbers of mass tort claims winning significant
punitive awards,27 the issue drew the attention of the Supreme Court.
The first intimations of major concern came in the late 1980s, when the
Court declined to address the constitutional merits of several punitive
awards, despite worries expressed by individual justices. 8 Eventually,
in the early 1990s, the Court imposed procedural due process controls
on punitive awards 9 and made clear that substantive due process,
embodying "general concerns of reasonableness" and proportionality,
is implicated in the judicial review of punitive awards. 30
Only in 1996, with BMWofNorth America v. Gore,3 did the Court fully
engage in proportionality review of a punitive damages award. By a 5-4
vote, the Court held that an award violated due process because it was
so excessive that the defendant lacked fair notice of its possible
23. RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNTHVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW ANtiD
PRACTICE, ch. 8 (2003).
24. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 14, § 4(c)(1).
25. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) (referring to punitive damages as "a monstrous
heresy" and "an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.").
26. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposalsfor Reform By Courts
and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1003, 1034-35 (1999) (chroniclingmajor awards). An equally vehement
chorus of commentators has questioned the actual extent of outlandish punitive awards, attributing a
political motive to reformers. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, DamageAwards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-
GrabbingAwards in Exxon Vuldez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129 (2001); Marc Galanter, Shadow
Play: The Fabled Aenace of Punitlie Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1.
27. John CalvinJeffries,jr., A Comment on the Constitutionaliy of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139,
141 (1986) (noting that before 1967, "the typical punitive damages claim arose from an isolated incident
involving only two parties").
28. See Browning-Feris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281-82 (1989) (Brennan,J.,
concurring) (expressing concern that "punitive damages arc imposed by juries guided by little more than
an admonition to do what they think is best"); id. at 282 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (expressing concern over "skyrocketing" punitive awards); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71, 87-88 (1988) (O'Connor,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (stating that
jurors' discretion to award punitives raises "serious" procedural die process concern).
29. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (vacating award because Oregon law
prohibited courts from reducing or vacating jury awards); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991) (supporting use ofjury instructions and post-trial and appellate review).
30. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458
(1993) (stating that "reasonableness" is central to substantive due process review and that an award violates
due process when it is "grossly excessive").
31. 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
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imposition. 2 Gore challenged BMW's nationwide policy of not advising
customers of paint damage sustained on its newly delivered cars, and
recovered $4,000 in compensatory and $4 million in punitive damages.
The punitive damage award was based on the finding that BMW's be-
havior satisfied Alabama's statutory prerequisite of "gross, oppressive or
malicious" fraud.33 In computing the award, the jury considered
evidence that BMW had sold 983 refinished cars nationwide, including
14 in Alabama, and that the actual market value of each car had been
diminished by $4,000."4 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court cut
the punitive award in half because the jury had improperly multiplied
Gore's compensatory damages by the number of sales in otherjurisdic-
tions.15
In reviewing the award, the Gore Court acknowledged at the outset
that punitive damages can "be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."36
However, any such award must be "reasonably necessary to vindicate"
the "scope" of these interests, which the majority emphasized was
limited by Alabama's geographic boundaries.37 Principles of "state
sovereignty and comity" prevented one state from imposing its policy
prerogative, backed by economic sanctions, on other states where such
behavior was perhaps lawful. 8 Alabama lacked the power "to punish
BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had no
impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor may Alabama impose sanc-
tions on BMW in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdic-
tions. )39
The Gore Court supported its conclusion by citing to its precedent
regarding criminal recidivist laws: "Habitual offender statutes permit
the sentencing court to enhance a defendant's punishment for a crime
in light of prior convictions, including convictions in foreign jurisdictions
... But we have never held that a sentencing court could properlypunish
lawful conduct."'4 The Court added, however, that while evidence of
out-of-state conduct may not be used as a "multiplier" in computing a
punitive award, "such evidence may be relevant to the determination of
32. M at 574-75.
33. Id. at 565.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id. at 567 (citing BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994)).
36. Id. at 568.
37. Id. at 568, 572-73.
38. Id. at571-72.
39. Id. at 573.
40. Id. at 573 n.19.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RECIDIVISTS
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."'" Moreover,
the Court expressly reserved judgment on the question of whether it is
proper for a jury to consider out-of-state unlawful conduct.42
With the evidentiary landscape thus limited, the Court proceeded to
assess whether the reduced $2 million award remained "grossly exces-
sive," identifying three "guideposts" to inform its excessiveness analysis:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the
ratio of the award to the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff; and (3) the
difference between the award and the civil or criminal sanctions that
could be imposed for similar conduct. 3 The Court characterized the
reprehensibility guidepost as "[p] erhaps the most important indicium"
of reasonableness, noting that both the nature of the underlying mis-
conduct and whether it has been repeated weigh in the analysis.'
Again, in support the Court referenced its treatment of criminal
recidivist laws:
Certainly, evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in pro-
hibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful
would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine
is required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law. Our hold-
ings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first
offender recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible
than an individual instance of malfeasance. 5
However, because BMW's nondisclosure policy did not so clearly
contravene the disclosure laws of other states as to put it on notice of its
wrongfulness, it could not be deemed a recidivist, thereby mitigating the
reprehensibility of its behavior.' This, together with the Court's finding
that the harm inflicted was "purely economic in nature" and did not
stem from an "indifference to or reckless disregard for the health or
safety of others,"47 warranted the conclusion that the $2 million award
violated BMW's due process rights.
The Court proceeded to find that the punitive award was unwar-
ranted under the second and third guideposts as well. Emphasizing that
no "simple mathematical formula" is available to determine a reason-
able ratio, the Court nonetheless expressed concern over the
41. Id. at574n.21.
42. Id. at 573 n.20.
43. Id. at 574-85.
44. Id. at 575-76.
45. Id. at 576-77 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 578. The Court rejected Gore's assertion that BMW was a recidivist because the company
changed its repaint policy once it "had been adjudged unlax{ul." Id. at 579.
47, Id. at 576.
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"breathtaking 500 to 1" ratio of the punitive award.48 The comparison
of civil or criminal sanctions for comparable misconduct inspired equal
concern. Fines in Alabama and elsewhere for deceptive trade practices
paled in comparison to the $2 million punitive award.49 Accordingly,
the Court remanded, leaving it to the Alabama Supreme Court to
determine whether a new trial was in order or only a determination "of
the award necessary to vindicate the economic interests of Alabama con-
sumers."
' 50
Gore, the Court's first decision overturning a punitive damages award
on substantive due process grounds, triggered considerable contro-
versy.5' Lower courts reached mixed results on the question expressly
reserved in Gore-whether unlawJul extraterritorial conduct could be
considered in the vindication of the state's "legitimate interests" of
punishing and deterring civil wrongdoers. 52 The question was com-
plicated by language in Gore ostensibly allowing consideration of out-of-
state behavior in the assessment of "the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct," yet precluding its use as a "multiplier" for award
amounts. 53 The gossamer distinction understandably fueled additional
confusion.'
The Court's 2003 decision in State Farm v. CampbeU 5 promised to
clarify the punitive damages jurisprudential landscape. At issue in State
Farm was a $145 million punitive award, based on $1 million in com-
pensatory damages, resulting from State Farm's bad faith refusal to
settle an earlier tort action against its insured, the Campbells. At trial,
the Utah court admitted extensive testimony regarding misconduct by
State Farm in its nationwide operations, "much" of which was lawful in
the jurisdictions where it occurred.-t Applying the Gore guideposts, a
48. Id. at 583.
49. Id. at 584.
50. Id. at 586.
51. See, e.g., Bruce J. McKee, The Implications ofBMW v. Gore for Future PunitiveDamages Lihkation:
Observationsfiom a Particpant, 48 ALA. L. REV. 175 (1996); Glen R. Whitehead, Cascnote, BMW ofNorth
America v. Gore: Is the Supreme Court Initiating Judicial Tort ReormJ, 16 QUINNmPIAC L, REv. 533 (1997).
52. See, e.g., White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002) (precluding
consideration); Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand, 214 F.3d 1235, 1253 (10th Cir. 2000) (allowing consideration);
Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1276 (D. Kan. 1998) (precluding consideration);
Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 2002) (allowing consideration), cert. granted,
vacated by 538 U.S. 1028 (2003).
53. Gore, 517 U.S. at574 n.21.
54. See McKee, supra note 51, at 219-20 (noting varied interpretations by courts); see also Margaret
Meriwethcr Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereigny md the Issue of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L.
REV. 275, 313 (1999) (referring to distinction as a "fine one").
55. 538 U.S. 408 (2003),
56. Id. at 422.
1616
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6-3 majority invalidated the award, finding the case "neither close nor
difficult." 57
Focusing first on reprehensibility, the Court cautioned that punitive
damages "should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability.., is so
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to
achieve punishment or deterrence." 58 While it acknowledged that State
Farm's behavior toward the Campbells "merits no praise," the Court
deemed the punitive award excessive based on the jury's heavy reliance
on State Farm's conduct outside Utah.59 As established in Gore, "[a]
State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful
where it occurred."6" The Court hastened to add that "[n]or, as a
general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of
the State's jurisdiction.""'
The Court reiterated that out-of-state conduct might be "probative"
of reprehensibility,62 but conditioned that it must be "similar" to and
have a "nexus" with the in-state conduct targeted by the punitive
award. "A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon
which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive
damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed
the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.""4 Again,
the Court invoked a parallel to its treatment of criminal recidivists, but
this time with an important qualification: "Although '[o]ur holdings
that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender
recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an
individual instance of malfeasance,' in the context of civil actions courts must
ensure the conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions. ,65 Because
much of the out-of-state conduct relied upon by the Utah jury was
lawful and there was "scant" or no evidence of repeated unlawful
conduct elsewhere similar to that injuring the Campbells, the award was
unconstitutionally excessive."
57. Id. at418.
58. Id at 419.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 421 (citing BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. at 422-23.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 423 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 577) (emphasis added).
66. Id. The majority elaborated on its reprehensibility finding:
The iepiehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that
a defendant may be punished forany malfeasance, which in this case extended fora 20-year
period. In this case, because the Campbells have shown no conduct by State Farm similar
2005] 1617
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The Court also found the award improper under the second and third
Gore guideposts. With respect to the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages awarded, the majority confirmed its reluctance
to prescribe any certain formula to gauge excessiveness, but emphasized
that "few awards" in excess of a single-digit ratio will satisfy due
process.67 Accordingly, the 145:1 ratio was presumably excessive, a
presumption afforded added weight because the "harm arose from a
transaction in the economic realm."6" The third guidepost likewise
suggested an excessive award: the most relevant civil sanction under
Utah law was a $10,000 fine for fraud, which was dwarfed by the $145
million punitive award. 9
B. Criminal Recidivist Laws
In the criminal law realm, recidivism is conceived as "a traditional,
if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an
offender's sentence."70  When first employed in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, criminal recidivist laws only enhanced the punish-
ment of offenders who repeatedly committed particular crimes.7 Given
that death was often imposed on even first-time offenders, however, such
laws were infrequently applied.72 In the U.S., with the increasing
mitigation of punishments in the late eighteenth centuiy, recidivist laws
eventually came to affect a broader range of criminal offenders. Starting
in the 1790s, legislatures enacted the first generalized "habitual felon"
and "repeat offender" laws, 73 and after crime wave panics in the 1920s
and 1930s, most states enacted recidivist laws of general application.74
to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to
the reprehensibility analysis.
Id. at 424. But see id. at 437 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) (asserting that the extraterritorial misconduct, while
varied in nature, "reflect[ed] an overarching underpayment scheme").
67. Id. at 425.
68. Id. at 426.
69. Id. at 428.
70. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243 (1998).
71. See George K. Brown, 7he Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23 CAN. B. REV. 640, 640-
41 (1945). The Massachusetts Bay Colony, for instance, enhanced sentences for repeat robbers and
burglars in particular. Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 511,511 n. 1 (1982). In Virginia, the House ofBurgesses in 1705 singled out recidivist hogstealers
for enhanced punishment. Id.
72. NORVAL MoRRIs, THE HABITUAL CRIM1NAL 18 (1951).
73. Brown, supra note 71, at 642.
74. Id. at 642-43. Professor Brown reports that until the beginning of the twentieth century
"recidivism was generally defined in terms of successive convictions for specific crimes," meaning that no
enhancement would attach if the latter conviction was for a dissimilar offense. Id at 644. He notes that
the shift toward "general recidivism" statutes stemmed from advances in criminological theory, in particular
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In the 1990s, a new wave of recidivist laws swept the states, marked by
much longer enhancements, stricter limits on exceptions to their
imposition, and expanded lists of offenses triggering enhancement
(including nonviolent offenses). 5 Today, all states have laws enhancing
the sentences of recidivist offenders.76 Twenty-six states have "three
strikes and you're out" laws, potentially providing for life in prison upon
a third felony conviction.77
Throughout their existence recidivist laws have been justified on
several bases. Specific deterrence is thought to be served because
offenders, facing enhanced sentences if they commit another offense,
will likely be more law abiding,78 and general deterrence, because the
enhanced sentence imposed on recidivists will discourage criminal
activity among other potential recidivists.79 Even if not successful as a
deterrent, enhanced sentences serve incapacitation interests-protecting
society by keeping recidivists imprisoned for longer periods of time.80
Finally, offenders who persist in crime are thought more culpable,
justifying enhanced punishment on retributive grounds. As the Supreme
Court put it over fifty years ago, an enhanced penalty is proper "for the
latest crime ... [insofar as it] is considered to be an aggravated offense
because a repetitive one."
8
'
the work of Cesare Lombroso, who urged recognition of "criminal types." Id. For more on the social
climate giving rise to the early twcnticth century view supporting the existence of a class of chronic
incorrigibles see Sir Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: The English
Expenence, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1313-17 (1980). Today, jurisdictions continue to single out repeat
violators of particular criminal laws for enhanced sentences, but do so concomitantly with recidivist
provisions ofgeneral scope. See, e.g., Mikell v. State, 510 SE.2d 523 (Ga. 1999); State v. Keith, 697 P.2d
145 (N.M. 1985); Seaton v. State, 718 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
75. Ronald F. Wright, 7 eStrikes Legislatin andSentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW& POL'Y 429,
442 (1998). For discussion of the social and political forces giving rise to the 1990s-genre laws see
FRANKLIN E. ZIMIRING ET AL., PUNISHMFNTI" AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN
CALIFORNIA (2001). Interestingly, recidivist laws in the first third of the century were "seldom used,"
because inter alia they were thought too harsh and difficult to apply. See Brown, supra note 71, at 658-64.
76. Erwin Chemerinsky, Crel and UnusuaL The Story ofLeandroAndrade, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4
(2003).
77. Id. at 5. In addition to rccidivist statutes, most if not all state sentencing systems provide for
enhancement based on past criminal misconduct. See Michael Edmund O'Neill, Abraham's Legacy: An
EmpiricalAssessment of('early) First- Tune Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291,305 n.52 (2001).
78. Robert Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Aleans: "Three Strikes and You're Out," 20J.
LECIS. 213, 218 (1994).
79. Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court ResloresDemocracy, 30 LOY.
L.A. L. REvI. 1601, 1643 (1997).
80. See Heglin, supra note 78, at 218.
81. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967)
(Warren, CJ., dissenting) ("A man's prior crimes are thought to aggravate his guilt for subsequent crimes,
and thus greater than usual retribution is warranted."); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616,623 (1912)
("Repetition of criminal conduct aggravates... guilt andjustiics heavier penalties when they are again
convicted."); cf HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT ON THE COMMISSION OFPRISONS 31 (1895) (" [T] he real
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Over the decades, an expansive body of law has come to govern how
prior convictions are to be counted for purposes of enhancing sentences.
In situations involving recidivists previously convicted of crimes within
thejurisdiction of the sentencing court, the determinations are relatively
clear-cut: State law typically specifies the types of prior offenses that can
serve as predicates for enhancement.82 With respect to prior convictions
occurring elsewhere, however, the situation is more fluid and consider-
ably more complex.
Although all jurisdictions today allow for consideration of extra-
territorial misconduct," they vary in how they go about doing so. The
majority of states employ an "internal" view by statute or common
law.8" Under this approach, the sentencing court of the forum state exa-
mines the elements of the foreign conviction to determine if it would
have qualified as a predicate for enhancement under its governing law. 5
Other states use an "external" view to assess foreign convictions for
purposes of enhancement.86 This more generous approach allows con-
sideration of foreign convictions if they are of the same class of crime
(typically a felony) that the forum state recognizes as a predicate for
enhancement, regardless of whether the elements of the foreign offense
satisfy a comparable predicate warranting enhancement in the forum.87
The external approach, in short, embodies the sentiment that "[g] ood
citizenship requires obedience and observance to the laws of sister states
as much as those of this state.""8
offense is the willful persistence in the deliberately acquired habit of crime."). For further discussion of
retributive principles in the context of recidivist laws see ANDREW VON HIRSH, PAST OR FUTURE cRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS A\D DANGEROUSNESS INTHESENTENCLING OFCRIMINAIs 77-91 (1985). Butsee GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAWV 460-66 (1978) (questioning whether prior record should
increase culpability).
82. See generally R.P. Davis, Annotation, What Constitutes Former "Conviction" ithin Statute Enhancing
Penaltyfor Second or Subsequent Offense, 5 A.L.R.2D 1080 (1949 & Supp. 2004).
83. Until the mid-1970s, Virginia refused to take account of any foreign conviction, allow% ing only
prior Virginia convictions to be considered for enhancement purposes. See Susan Buckley, Note, Don't Steal
a Turkey in Arkansar-The Second Felony Offender in uew York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 76, 79 (1976). For
discussion of the Virginia law in particular see Note, Recidivism and Virginia's "Come-Back" Law, 48 VA. L.
REV. 597 (1962).
84. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age ofCniminalJiustice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
85. The states vary in their rigor of this analysis. Ncw York, for instance, uses a strict "same
elements" test, whereas other states apply a "substantially" similar or eqtixvalent test. Id. (citing laws in
Ohio and Florida).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. State v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146, 149 (Idaho 1942). States are considerably less generous with
regard to prior convictions in foreign nations. While eight states explicitly authorize such consideration,
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia expressly preclude it, and the remaining jurisdictions are
unclear on the question. See Martha Kimes, Note, The Effect ofForeign Criminal Convictions Under American
Repeat Offender Statutes. A CaseAgainst the Use ofFreign Crinmes in Determining Habitual Criminal Status, 35 COLUM.
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For its part, federal law takes account of state court convictions in
several different ways. Under the federal "three strikes" provision, 9 for
instance, recidivists with qualifying criminal histories face mandatory life
imprisonment.9" Predicates include either convictions for two prior
"serious violent" felonies or one prior serious violent felony and one
"serious drug" conviction,9" with both federal and state convictions
being eligible.9" In addition, the Armed Career Criminal Act93 considers
prior state convictions as predicates, and the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines94 consider prior state convictions in assessing "criminal history" and
"[c]areer [o]ffender" status.95 Under the federal death penalty law,
statutory aggravating factors take account of specified prior convictions
adjudicated by state and federal courts.96 In construing the afore-
mentioned provisions, the federal courts have created a complex case
law regarding how prior state convictions are to be assessed in deter-
mining enhancements.97
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 507-08 (1997). Likewise, states differ on whether prior court-martial convictions
can be used as an enhancement basis. Seegeneral y Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Use of Pri or lilitay Con-
viction to Establish Repeat Offinder Status, II A.L.R.5TH 218 (1993 & Supp. 2004). On the other hand, it is
generally held that federal convictions can be used to enhance state court sentences. See Davis, supra note
82, § 20.
89. 18 U.S.CA § 3559 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
90. Id. § 3559(c)(1).
91. Id. § 3559(c)(l)(A)(ii).
92. Id. § 3559(c)(1)(A). &egenerally R. Daniel O'Connor, Note, Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis
of the Classification of Prior Convitoans Under the Federal "Three Strikes andTou're Out"Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV. 847,
849-51 (1995).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000 & Supp. I12002).
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(5) (2002).
95. O'Connor, supra note 92, at 855-56. Under the Guidelines, foreign nation convictions cannot
play a role in a defendant's criminal history score, but they canjustify an upward departure from the usual
range of punishment. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.2(h), 4A1.3(a) (2002). Select
federal statutes, however, do permit consideration of foreign nation convictions. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(44) (2004) (including foreign convictions as predicate "felony drug" offenses).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(2) (2000) (specifying as an aggravator that "the defendant has previously
been convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a time of imprisonment of more than 1 year,
involving the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm... against another person").
97. In Taylorv. United States, 495 U.S. 578 (1990), for instance, the Court wrestled with how the prior
'violent felony" requirement of the Armed Carecr Criminal Act ssas to be interpreted. Petitioner
contended that his prior state conviction in Missouri for second-degree burglary did not satisfy the
requirement. Id. at 579. The Court acknowledged that states vary widely in their definitions of burglary,
yet refused to infer that Congress intended to have the meaning of burglary
depend on the definition adopted by the State of conviction. That would mean that a
person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm would, or would not, receive a sentence
enhancement based on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the State of his
prior conviction happened to call the conduct "burglary."
Id. at 590-91. The Court ultimately embraced a definition in the "generic sense in which the term is now
used in the criminal codes ofmost states." Id. at 598. The court adopted a "categorical approach," which
examines only the statutory definitions of prior offenses, "not the ... particular facts underlying those con-
victions." Id. at 600. On the other hand, lower federal courts, interpreting other enhancement provisions,
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No such complexity, however, has been evidenced in constitutional
challenges to recidivist laws, which have proven impregnable to attack.
Ex post facto challenges are rejected on the reasoning that the most
recent offense occurred after the enactment of the enhancement provi-
sion, justifying greater punishment for the new offense.98 Likewise,
recidivist laws withstand double jeopardy challenges because, rather
than authorizing added punishment for the earlier offense, they enhance
the latter: "the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense...
[is] 'a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an
aggravated offense because a repetitive one."' 99 Equal protection chal-
lenges also regularly meet with defeat, with courts finding the special
targeting of recidivists warranted by the government's police power
authority.' Due process attacks are turned back on the rationale that
recidivist laws do not create a new basis for criminal culpability, but
rather merely prescribe "circumstances wherein one found guilty of a
specific crime may be more severely penalized because of his previous
criminalities." l  Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court in
Apprendi v. New Jersey carved out a special Sixth Amendment exception
for prior convictions in sentencing decisions, holding that "[o] ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0 2
Over the years, Eighth Amendment challenges to recidivist laws have
achieved a degree of limited success." 3 In the Court's 2003 decision
have embraced a "factual approach," involving review of the particular conduct supporting the predicate
conviction. See, e.g., United Statesv. Bridges, 175F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying factual test in deter-
mining criminal history category under Guidelines).
98. See, e.g., Giahann v. West Virginia, 244 U.S. 616 (1912). Fora survey ofex post facto challcngcs
brought against recidivist laws in state courts during the past ten years see Wayne A. Logan, "Democratic
Despotism" and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of E, Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS.J. 439,484-86 (2004).
99. Witte v. United Suites, 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (citation omitted); see also Moore v. Missouri,
159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (stating that the enhanced punishment "is for the last offence committed, and it
is rendered more severe in consequence of the situation into which the party had previously brought
himself").
100. See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 US. 311 (1901). One exception is Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942), where the Court granted an equal protection challenge to a law that singled out only
particular types of recidivists for sterilization-a sanction distinctly different from incarceration.
101. Goodman v. Kunkle, 72 F.2d 334, 336 (7th Cir 1934).
102. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). It remains to be seen, however, whether the prior conviction
exception will enduie. While recentApprendi-related decisions have left thc cxccption intact, see, e.g., Blakcly
v.Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), a majority ofjustices now appear inclined to rescind it. SeeShepard
v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1264 (2005) (Thomas,J, concurring) (noting same).
103. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (granting challenge to recidivist sentence of life without
possibility of parole); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (rejecting challenge to recidivist sentence of
life with possibility of parole). For discussion of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with regard
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Ewing v. California,'0 4 however, the abiding hope that meaningful limits
might be imposed on recidivist laws was dashed. Ewing was convicted
of stealing three golf clubs, and ultimately convicted of felony grand
theft, as a result of the prosecutor's discretionary refusal to treat the mis-
conduct as a non-qualifying offense.' °  The conviction triggered
California's "three strikes" law, mandating imposition of a sentence of
twenty-five years to life.° 6 Noting that successful Eighth Amendment
challenges to non-capital sentences "have been exceedingly rare,"'1
0 7
because the Amendment prohibits "only extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime,"' 8 a plurality of the Court
upheld the sentence.' 9 Although Ewing's sentence was a "long one,"
his was not "the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality." ' 0
With Ewing, the Court signaled its willingness to stand clear of what
it called the "sea change in criminal sentencing" manifest in recently
enacted recidivist sentencing laws."I In targeting recidivists, "the State's
to non-capital sentences more generally see Wayne A. Logan, Proportionalioy and Punislunent: Imposmg Lfe
Wihout Parole onjaveni/es, 33 WAKE FOREST L. RE\!. 681, 693-709 (1998).
104. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
105. Id. at 16. Ewing's offense was a "wobbler" under California law, meaning that it could be
classified as either a felony or a misdemeanor. See id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West 1999)).
106. Id at 20. California adopted its "three strikes" law "to ensure longer prison sentences and
greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or
violcnt felony offenses." CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999). The law also permits enhancements for
offenders with only one prior felony conviction, without any requirement that the prior felony be "serious"
or "violent" as required by the "three strikes" law. Id. § 667(e)(1). If applicable, the provision doubles the
length of the sentence otherwise imposed. Id.
107. Ewing, 538U.S. at21.
108. Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (KennedyJ, concurring)); see also
id. at 20 (citation omitted) (acknowledging that the Eighth Amendment contains only a "narrows
proportionality principle").
109. The main opinion was written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy. Justices Thomas and Scalia wrote separate concurrences, reconfirming their views that
the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle. See id. at 31 (ScaliaJ., concurring); id. at
32 (Thomas,J, concurring).
110. Id. at 30 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy,J, concurring)). Presumably, if gross
disproportionality were found as a "threshold" matter, the Court then would assess whether the sentence
was undue compared to that imposed for other crimes within thejurisdiction and for the same type ofcrime
in other juisdictions. This approach was endorsed by Justice Kennedy in his Harmelin concurrence and
invoked in Ewing. Id.
111. Id. at 24. In a companion case, Looyer v. Andrue, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the Court rejected a
proportionality challenge from a recidivist cumulatively sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of
parole for fifty years, whose second and third strikes resulted from theft of S153 worth of children's
videotapes. Andrade involved the distinct issue of the availability of habeas corpus relief among state
prisoners, allowed only ifa state court decision is "contrary to," or an "unreasonable application of. clearly
established federal law." Id. at 70 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)). The 5-4 majority concluded
that neither criterion was met, reaffirming that the gross disproportionality standard is satisfied "only in the
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interest is not merely punishing the offense of conviction, or the
'triggering' offense: '[I]t is in addition the interest... in dealing in a
harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown
that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as
established by its criminal law."' " 2 Accordingly, the proportionality of
the sentence imposed on Ewing was not to be assessed merely in terms
of the three golf clubs stolen, but rather Ewing's entire offense history.
In assessing the proportionality of a recidivist's sentence, "[w]e must
place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history
of felony recidivism." 113
C. The Court's Ambivalent Stance on Extraterritorialiy
Viewed independently, State Farm and Ewing represent the most
significant decisions to date from the Court on the constitutional para-
meters of criminal sentence lengths and punitive damage awards. With
Ewing, the Court signaled that for all intents and purposes the Eighth
Amendment will not impede state efforts to impose harsh sentences
upon criminal recidivists, even those convicted of nonviolent crimes.' 14
It now appears that the Court's hypothetical scenario of deeming
disproportionate a legislative choice to punish "overtime parking... by
life imprisonment" holds the only viable promise of a successful
constitutional challenge. "15 In State Farm, the Court made clear its acute
concern over punitive damage awards, specifying for the first time that
"few awards" that exceed a "single-digit" multiplier of compensatory
awards will satisfy due process. "6 Moreover, the Court's decision "dealt
a body blow" to the consideration of extraterritorial wrongdoing,'17
'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case." Id. at 73 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
112. Ewing, 528 U.S. at 29 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)).
113. Id.
114. As a result, Ewing doubtless will be used in future cases as a basis to deny proportionality
challenges to heavy sentences for violent crimes. See e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 943 (5th
Cir. 1997) (using Court's decision in Rummel, where the Court upheld a life sentence imposed on a three-
time recidivist, as "benchmark" to uphold 30-year sentence for use of a machine gun in a drug deal).
115. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.1 1).
116. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
117. Mark G. Bonino, The US. Supreme Court and Punitive Damages: On the Road to Reform, 70 DEF.
COUNS.J. 432, 432 (2003). The extent to which this giddy assessment is warranted remains to be seen,
however. Courts are showing some willingness to consider evidence ofout-of-state wrongdoing, at least in
some circumstances. See, e.g., Boyd v. Goffoli, 608 S.E.2d 169, 179 (W. Va. 2004) (holding that "a State
has a legitimate interest in imposing damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside
of the State'sjurisdiction where the State has a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to
the plaintiffs' claims which arise from the unlawful out-of-state conduct").
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marking a reversal from its prior apparent willingness to take full
account of such information. ' 8
Viewed in tandem, State Farm and Ewing underscore the existence of
a distinct constitutional divide in the judicial review of punitive damage
awards and criminal sentences. Not surprisingly, the Court's more
robust engagement with the former has not gone unnoticed. As one
commentator caustically offered, the variation highlights a troubling
constitutional value judgment seemingly at work in the Court: that
"cyour money means more than your life."'' 9 That such heightened
scrutiny should be predicated on substantive due process, a constitu-
tional bite noire of the Rehnquist Court, 2 ' at the expense of a sovereign
state court,' 21 affords additional evidence to suspect that a double
standard is at work.
22
To give the Court its due, however, the divergent results plausibly can
be explained at least in part by the distinct legal regimes under which
punitive awards and criminal sentences are imposed. As the State Farm
majority noted, "[a]lthough [punitive awards] serve the same purposes
as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil
118. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (rejecting argument
that it was improper forjury to consider "evidence of [defendant's] alleged wrongdoing in other parts of
the country," noting that such consideration was permitted "[u]nder well-settled law"). For earlier
pronouncements to this same effect see, for example, 3J.G. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES 727 (1883) (endorsing consideration of "any facts [that] may be shown to enhance punitive
damages," including "previous threats" by the defendant), and Theron Metcalf, Damages EDeicto, 3 AM.
L. MAG. 270, 287 (1830) ("[C] ircumstances which form no part of the actionable matter of a suit, may be
given in evidence to aggravate damages.").
119. Alan B. Morrison, four Money or Iour Lfe: The Supreme Court Places More Value on the Purse than on
Personal Freedom, LEGAL TD..IF,, May 19, 2003, at 67; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1080 (2004) (concluding that "[t]here is something just wrong with a
Court that has no problem" with upholdinga life term for a modest recidivist offense "but is outraged when
too much is taken from a company in punitive damages when it defrauds its customers").
120. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (stating that "[m]any times ... we have
expressed our reluctance to cxpand the doctrine of substantive due process"). Of course, the Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), invalidating the criminalization of same-sex consensual
sodomy on due process grounds, represents a notable-and controversial-exception. For discussion of
the Court's uneven embrace of due process, with attention to its application of the doctrine in punitive
damages but not challenges to civil forfeitures, see Susan R. Klein, TheDiscriminaty Application ofSubstantive
Due Process: A Tale oflTwo Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453.
121. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (noting that "[n]ot long ago, this Court
was hesitant to impose a federal check on state-court judgments awarding punitive damages").
122. If indeed this is so it gives rise to an additional irony: while crime victims have come to enjoy
increasing political influence and power, tort victims have experienced just the opposite, often becoming
the target of political ridicule and disdain. See Michael L. Rusad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theor, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2002)
(describing instances). This despite the fact that punitive damage doctrine itself has been characterized as
a direct antecedent of the modem victims' rights movement in the criminal justice system. See Thomas B.
Colby, Boyond the Multiple Punishment Problem.. Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual Private Wrongs, 87
MINN. L. RIv. 583, 635-36 (2003).
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cases have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal
proceeding. This increases our concerns over the imprecise manner in
which punitive damages systems are administered."' 2 3 Moreover, as
Professor Pamela Karlan has observed, the distinct levels of judicial
deference can be explained by the fact that, unlike the criminal realm
where legislatures determine sentence maxima, individual civil juries
assess punitive awards free of such political accountability and practical
limits (assuming statutory caps are not in place).'24 Heightened scrutiny
of punitive awards also might bejustified by the institutional reality that
the Supreme Court is the sole locus of federal review of state jury
punitive awards, while state criminal sentences can be challenged colla-
terally in federal court as well as on direct appeal. 2 5
Although these observations perhaps provide a convincing basis to
explain the Court's varied treatment of proportionality in the civil and
criminal contexts, they fail to account for the varied role extraterritorial
misconduct can now play in the actual assessment of punitive awards
and criminal sentences. Despite the Court's avowed sensitivity to repeat
wrongdoing in assessing the culpability of civil and criminal wrongdoers
alike, regardless of where the prior transgressions occurred,'26 State Farm
makes clear that the worlds are not so comparable after all. Whereas
states freely consider extraterritorial misconduct when sentencing
criminal recidivists,' 27 such freedom is absent in the imposition of puni-
tive damage awards. "[A]s a general rule" a state has no "legitimate
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for
unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction.' ' 28  Of
course, the Court's "general rule" qualifying language leaves some
possible room on the question. 9 Nevertheless, its insistence that in
123. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417; see also id. at428 (statng that "[g] reat care must be taken to avoid
use of the civil process to assess criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections
of a criminal trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof").
124. Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines". The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal
Punishment, 88 MINN. L. RFV. 880, 912 (2004).
125. Id. at 910-11 (citingState Farm, 538 U.S. at 430 (GinsburgJ., dissenting)).
126. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n. 19 (1996) (emphasis added) (concluding that
its prior punitive damage decisions and those "concerning recidivist statutes are not to the contrary.
Habitual offender statutes permit the sentencing court to enhance a defendant's punishment for a crime
in light of prior convictions, including convictions inforeignjurisdii ions.").
127. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
128. State Farm, 538 U.S. at421.
129. There also remains some question overwhetherand to what extent extraterritorial conduct may
be considered in assessing punitive awards based on physical injury rather than economic harm. However,
this possibility is of little consequence to the discussion here, given that in the criminal realm "economic"
crimes regularly trigger enhanced sentences under recidivist laws. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,30-
31 (2003) (upholding recidivist sentence of 25-lifi for "third strike" of stealing three golf clubs); Michael
Vitiello, 77ree Strikes: Can We Return to Rationdity?, 87J. CRItM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 396 n.8 (1997)
(citing similar examples).
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"civil actions . . . the conduct in question replicate[ ] the prior trans-
gressions"3 0 sharply limits such consideration, and as discussed later,
itself distinguishes the law's treatment of tortfeasors from criminal
recidivists.
In sum, State Farm and Ewing highlight distinctly different views of how
recidivist wrongdoing should figure in evaluating the appropriateness of
punitive damage awards and criminal sentences. This asymmetry not
only underscores the continued existence of a civil-criminal divide, but
also presents an array of theoretical and practical issues that warrant
exploration. It is to these issues that the discussion now turns.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN TORT AND CRIME
A. Federalism, Comity, and Recidivism
In both Gore and State Farm the Court made plain its concern over the
consideration of extraterritorial misconduct in the assessment of punitive
awards. The Gore majority took the initial step toward circumscribing
such consideration. Even before evaluating the three guideposts pre-
scribed for determining whether an award is "grossly excessive," analysis
must "begin[] with an identification of the state interests that a punitive
award is designed to serve"-retribution and deterrence.' 3 ' These
interests, however, are delimited by federalism and comity concerns: no
state can "infring[e] on the policy choice[] of other States."' 32 Citing
several of the Court's early decisions endorsing the limited extraterri-
torial effect of state laws, 33 the Gore majority held that Alabama lacked
"interest" in punishing or deterring conduct that was lawful elsewhere
and invalidated the punitive award imposed on BMW.'34 In State Farm,
the majority did not begin with an independent identification of state
interests, electing instead to proceed directly to the excessiveness
inquiry. However, it invoked the same precedent on extraterritoriality
in reiterating the prohibited consideration of lawful conduct135 and
elaborated that Utah lacked a "legitimate concern in imposing punitive
130. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added). Moreover, definitional uncertainty exists over
what might be meant by "unlawful." See, e.g., Barkerv. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39,41 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that
a distinction must be drawn between "lawful activities regulated by statute and [those] activities which arc
entirely prohibited by law"); efJOHN E. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL": BUSPN.Ss CRIME
IN AMERICA (1977) (observing that "illegal" is not synonymous with "criminal").
131. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
132. Id. at 572.
133. Id. at571-72.
134. Id. at 573-74.
135. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 421.
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damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside the
State's jurisdiction." 136
The Court's position on extraterritorial civil misconduct is note-
worthy in several respects. As an initial matter, it sheds light on the
central question of the interrelation of sovereign laws in a federalist
system. To the State Farm majority, the consideration of extraterritorial
misconduct amounted to a choice of law question. Under this view,
"[a] ny proper adjudication of conduct that occurred outside Utah to
other persons would require their inclusion, and, to those parties, the
Utah courts, in the usual case, would need to apply the laws of their
relevant jurisdiction."1 37
The Court's analysis, however, appears misplaced in the context of
assessing the reprehensibility of a punitive damages defendant. With
choice of law, the issue is whether a forum state can apply its substantive
law to adjudicate liability, with the forum being free to do so if there
exists a "significant contact... creating state interests, such that choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." '38 With repre-
hensibility analysis, the issue is not whether the substantive law of the
forum state or another state should apply to determine liability per se,
but rather whether the extraterritorial misconduct of a tortfeasor aggra-
vates the tortfeasor's culpability, justifying increased punitive damages.
The State Farm majority thus appears to have elided the subtle distinction
drawn in Gore between "punishing" extraterritorial misconduct (imper-
missible) and using it as an evidentiary basis to gauge reprehensibility in
assessing damages (permissible). '39 As a consequence, it has constitution-
alized a choice of law rule where none was required. 40 Furthermore,
as Professor Catherine Sharkey has rightly noted, the Court created a
curious inconsistency insofar as no such extraterritorial limits constrain
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985)).
138. Shutts, 472 U.S at 818.
139. SeeGore, 517 U.S. at574 n.21.
140. Moreover, contrary to the impression afforded in State Farm, "state interests" analysis in choice
of law has become increasingly flexible over the years. See Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choie and Choice of
I : Abortion. The Right to Traoe and Ertrateritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451,
482-83 (1992) (discussing evolution). Indeed, two weeks after deciding State Farm the Court unanimously
backed the authority of a forum state to apply its law in litigation involving multistate disputes and interests,
even when the law elsewhere conflicted. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). Hyatt
concluded that "[w]ithout a rudder to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of
balancing coordinate States' competing sovereign inteests to resolve conflicts of laws." Id. at 499. The
willingness of the Court in State Farm to gainsay extraterritoriality in assessing punitive damages as a
constitutional matter, yet liberate jurisdictions in civil choice of law situations more generally-despite
viewing the latter as precedent for the formei-represents a notable paradox. See also Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Teoritorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 257 (1992) (noting that "[alt the constitutional level, the modern Supreme Court has all but
abandoned the field" of choice of law doctrine and rules).
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class action lawsuits comprised of litigants from multiple jurisdictions
seeking compensatory (as opposed to punitive) awards. 4' Nor, for that
matter, does the Court explain why or how its caveat allowing for
continued potential consideration of "similar" extraterritorial miscon-
duct lessens the threat posed by "other parties' hypothetical claims"
being pressed against a punitive damages defendant. 
42
Yet, even if the matter were properly conceived as a question of sub-
stantive choice of law application, the Court's position on punitive dam-
ages in State Farm highlights a fundamental contrast with the criminal
law realm.'43 While constitutional vicinage provisions can effectively
limit the capacity of states to address extraterritorial criminal acts,'4" and
the common law was predisposed against extraterritoriality, 14 5 the
modem trend has been to the contrary."4 In Strassheim v. Daily,'4 7 for
141. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as SocietalDamages, 113 YALE LJ. 347, 429-32 (2003).
Professor Sharkey observes that "[t]he Court has yet to develop any underlying justification for such a
distinction, at least with respect to states' respective territorial spheres of regulation. In fact, it is difficult
to imagine any such justification based on its previously announced principles of sovereignty, comity, and
choice of law." Id. at 431
142. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
143. The extraterritoriality application of domestic criminal laws remains a vastly understudied
subject, which is surprising given the ever increasing reach of prosecutorial interests and interrelations
among state crime control efforts. The commentaty that exists largely dates from several decades ago. See,
e.g., Wendell Berge, CriminalJuridiction and the TerrtorialPrinciple, 30 MICH. L. REV. 238 (1931): Paul D.
Empson, 7h eApplication of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside theJurisdition, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967);
BJ. George,Jr., E'traerritorialApplication of PenalLegislation, 64 MICH.L. REv. 609 (1966); Robert A. Leflar,
Conflict ofLazws: Choice ofLm, in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RES. I. REV. 44 (1974); Albert Levitt,JTirisdiction
Over Cimes, 16J. AI. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316 (1925); Rollin M. Perkins, 77e Territorial
Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS LJ. 1155 (1971); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislatize
Jurisdiction and the State Criminal lazv, 38 TEX. L. REV. 763 (1960).
Renewed scholarly interest in extraterritoriality arose in the early 1990s, triggered by the 5 4
vote in Planned Parenthood t. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and the specter that states would once again crimi-
nally regulate abortions, prompting question over the extraterritorial reach of such laws. See, e.g., C. Steven
Bradford, Pwit Happens if Roe is Overruled' Evtratereitorial Regulation ojAbortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
87(1993); Seth F. Kreimer, But li17wever Treasures Freedom...: The Rght to Travel and Extraterritaial Abortions,
91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993). For an argument in favor of states' authority to regulate the extraterritorial
behavior of their own citizens in particular see Mark D. Rosen, Evtrateoitorialiy and Political Heterogeneiy in
American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855 (2002).
144. See George, supra note 143, at 631. Professor George, however, refers to such requirements as
an obstacle that "preserve [s] in constitutional amber the rote thinking" of the past. Id. at 636.
145. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 4.4(a) (2d ed. 2003). Under the tradi-
tional "territorial theory" ofjurisdiction, "a state has power to make conduct or the result of the conduct
a crime if the conduct takes place or the result happens within its territorial limits. Conversely, there can
be no territorial jurisdiction where conduct and its results both occur outside its territory." Id. § 4.4(a), at
295.
146. See People v. Betts, 103 P.3d 883, 887 (Cal. 2005) ("Although the constitutional limits of state
courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal matters have not been precisely delineated, it is clear that
states may extend their jurisdiction beyond the narrow limits imposed by the common law."); Kreiroer,
.mpra note 140, at 469-87 (tracingjurisprudential and statutory evolution away from strict adherence to
territoriality principle).
147. 221 U.S. 280 (1921).
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example, the defendant bribed a Michigan state official in Chicago,
inducing him to overpay for inferior used machinery, and was success-
fully prosecuted in Michigan despite not visiting the state until long after
the bribery. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes concluded that
"[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce... detri-
mental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect."' 48  Similarly, in Skiriotes v.
Florida,'49 the Court upheld application of a Florida law that prohibited
sponge fishing beyond its territorial waters, reasoning that the state had
a "legitimate interest" in regulating the sponge industry even outside its
borders. 5 0 Model Penal Code section 1.03, adopted by 29 states,' 5 ' goes
even further. It provides that a defendant can be criminally liable if "the
offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct
outside the State."'152
Laws regarding the treatment of criminal recidivists are in accord.
When a sentencing court relies upon foreign misconduct to enhance a
sentence, as is customary, it is in effect engaging in extraterritoriality,
despite the comity concerns often presented.'53 There is no mistaking
148. Id. at 285; see a/so id. at 284-85 (stating that "the usage of the civilized world would warrant
Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete");
Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 398 (1863) (concluding that a state can apply laws against its own citizens
"which are binding and obligatory upon them evcrywhere, and for the violation of which they may be
punished whenever the state can find them"); cf. United States v. Bowman, 269 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)
(recognizing that there are "criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality
for the Government's jurisdiction, but arc enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud, wherever perpetrated").
149. 313 U.S. 69(1941).
150. Id. at 77. For more modem cases approving of state criminal jurisdiction over fishing in
extraterritorial waters see, for example, Stae v. Bondurant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976), Peoplev. Weeren, 607
P.2d 1279 (Cal. 1980), and Lizrings . Davis, 465 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1985).
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03 cmt. 1 (1985).
132. Id. § 1 03(1)(0. The sole proviso is that the conduct "bear[] a reasonable relation to a legitimate
interest of rthe] State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest."
Id. § 1.03 cmt. 6. See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007, 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (permitting
prosecution of divorced father for custodial interference despite fact that "all the acts constituting the
offense were committed outside of the state"). For discussion of the extraterritorial reach of criminal laws
in the international context, which the Model Penal Code relied upon to create its "state interest" criterion
tojustify broadened domestic jurisdiction, see George, supra note 143, at 613-14, 626-28.
153. For example, when the sentencing forum takes account of a foreign state conviction that is (I)
not considered for purposes of recidivism there, (2) has been pardoned or expunged or (3) dismissed because
court-imposed conditions were satisfied, in effect there occurs a voiding ofpolicyjudgment. As one federal
court put it: "the profile of the shadow that conviction castson later events is the husinessofthe state where
those later events occur." Poo v. Hood, No. 89 Civ 7874, 1992 WL 30617, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1992);
see also People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 40 (Cal. 2004) (stating that "[n]o matter what lenience Arizona may
or may not bestow upon its recidivist criminals who have committed domestic violence felonies, once we
are satisfied that ... such conviction constitutes a strike under our three strikes law, that prior crime will
count here"); State v. Pope, 927 P.2d 503, 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (enhancing sentence in Kansas based
on priorjuvenile adjudication in Missouri, even though Missouri recidivist law would disregard juvenile
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that the varied policy judgments giving rise to such conflicts reflect basic
normative differences in the perceived social gravity of unlawful acts,
154
and differences in how government should respond to them. '55 Applica-
tion of the State Farm logic, however, would suggest that a jurisdiction
would have no "valid interest" to advance when it enhanced punish-
ment based on out-of-state prior misconduct. 156 In short, it is plain that
criminal recidivist laws definitely do have "force of themselves beyond
the jurisdiction" that enacted them.15' And such force results in added
deprivations of physical liberty, sometimes very significant, not mone-
tary losses, as is the case with punitive awards.
Relatedly, the State Farm majority's overriding concern for notice-for
example, requiring that out-of-state illegality "replicate" that justifying
a punitive award---stands in sharp contrast to judicial treatment of
recidivist laws. Recidivist offenders are presumed to be aware that prior
extraterritorial wrongs, even of a dissimilar nature, can enhance their
sentence for a later conviction. This is so despite the reality that courts
adjudications); State v. Bush, 9 P.3d 219,224-25 (Nash. Ct. App. 2000) (permitting Kansas misdemeanor
conviction to be classified as felony for purposes of enhancement in Washington).
A similar outcome obtains when another sovereign would consider a subsequent oflense for
recidivist purposes, yet the sentencingforum does not. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d
1201, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to consider California pctty theft conviction as basis for federal
,enhancement); Elston v. State, 687 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)(refusing toconsiderGeorgia
felony conviction for robbery); State v. Glenn, 493 So. 2d 806, 814 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to
consider Texas felony conviction for unauthorized use of vchicle).
154. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) ("Our federal system recognizes the
independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law."); State v. Langlands, 583
S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4 (Ga. 2003) ("A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal
code. When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it is conveying
in the clearest possible terms its view of public policy.").
155. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (parameters ofrecidivistenhancemnt laws "are
matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction").
156. This same argument was advanced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as a reason to bar
consideration of extraterritorial unlawful conduct in punitive damage awards, in a decision rendered before
State Farm. See White v. Ford Motor Go., 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion amended and rehg denied, 335
F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2003). In addition to the possible difficulty of having to identify whether the behavior
at issue is unlawful elsewhere, the court reasoned that "the variation in policies of punishment, even where
the conduct is unlawful in all states, amounts to an important distinction in policy." Id. at 1017. In
support, the court discussed differences in punitive damage awards available in different states, including
the existence of statutory caps in some and "split-recovery" statutes in others. Id.
157. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (quoting Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657,669 (1892)). InAttrill, it bears mention, the Court held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a state to enforce the penal judgment of another state in contravention of its own
statutes or policy. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n.6 (1942) ("It has been
repeatedly held that the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to enforce the penal laws of
another."); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFJCT OF LAWS 1177-78 (3d ed. 2000) (noting same). Fairly
interpreted, Attrill thus in no wayprohibitsa state from making evidentiary use of wrongdoing in a sister state
to enhance a criminal sentence. See Laino, 87 P.3d at 890. By extension, then, it should not prohibit
evidentiary use of extraterritorial misconduct in the civil realm.
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themselves must often undertake a complex, post-hoc analysis of
whether the earlier extraterritorial wrongdoing warrants consideration
under the enhancement law of the forum state. 58  Moreover, when
assessing out-of-state wrongdoing, criminal courts often assess the entire
record of the prior proceeding,"5 9 possibly taking into account mis-
conduct not resulting in conviction,"'6 which should (but does not) give
rise to similar concern over "hypothetical claims" voiced by the State
Farm majority. With regard to actual convictions in foreignjurisdictions,
those that would not warrant recidivist treatment there, 6' or are aged' 
6 2
or have been pardoned or expunged, 163 also are all fair game. In short,
unlike punitive damages defendants, criminal defendants are expected
to run the risk that their prior out-of-state wrongdoing will affect a
subsequent sentence, without raising constitutional concern.
The foregoing, however, fails to give weight to a key fact in both State
Farm and Gore: both involved corporate defendants engaged in interstate
commerce.'6 4 To the Court, this presents two potential concerns. The
158. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text; see also People v. Woodell, 950 P.2d 85. 88 (Cal.
1998) (noting that "[t]here is... no guarantee the statutory definition of the crime in the otherjurisdiction
will contain all the necessary elements to qualify as a predicate felony in California"); State v. Gonzalez,
No. C3-03-156, 2003 WL 22232900, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2003) (noting "ambiguities" yet
holding that prior offense in Georgia did warrant severity increase under Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines).
159. See, e.g., People v. Myers, 858 P.2d 301 (Cal. 1993); People v. Samms, 731 N.E.2d 1118 (N.Y.
2000); State v. Mutch, 942 P.2d 1018 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); seealso People v. Purata, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
664,666 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "the trier of fact may go beyond the least adjudicated elements ofthe
offense and consider evidence found within the entire record of the foreign conviction").
160. See. e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 153-57 (1997) (per curiam) (holding thatevidence
of misconduct of which the defendant has been acquitted may be considered at sentencing); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399-401 (1995) (holding that evidence of uncharged misconduct can be
considered at sentencing). This broad view is thought to bejustified because sentencing requires that "the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics" be available, allowing for
a "more enlightened and just sentence." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 250-51 (1949).
161. See, e.g., State v. Pope, 927 P.2d 503, 511 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (enhancing sentence based on
priorjuvenile adjudication in foreign state, even though foreign enhancement law would disregard juvenile
record). Similarly, NewJersey considers foreign misdemeanor convictions, while most other states, such
as Rhode Island, do not. See NJ. STAT. ANN § 2C:44-4(c) (West 1995); R.I. GEN, LAWS § 12-19-21(a)
(2003). As a result, a Rhode Island misdemeanor can result in enhancement in NewJersey, but not vice
versa.
162. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-81 (2002) (omitting any time limit in considering prior
convictions for purposes of determining habitual offender status and expressly allowing consideration of
prior convictions "whether in this state or elsewhere").
163. See, e.g., People v. Biggs, 71 P.2d 214, 216 (Cal. 1937); see also id. ("To say... that the offender
is a 'new man,' and 'as innocent as if he had never committed the offense,' is to ignore the difference
between the crime and the criminal."); cf. People v. liano, 87 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2004) (holding that prior guilty
plea in Arizona, ultimately resulting in dismissal because the defendant successfully completed probation,
could be used for enhancement under California's "three strikes" law).
164. Writing for the majority in Gore, Justice Stevens emphasized that damage awards imposed on
active participant[s] in the national economy implicate[] the federal interest in preventing
CIVIL AND CRIMIAL RECIDIVISTS
first again relates to notice insofar as corporate tortfeasors are often
exposed to a "patchwork" of social and economic regulations. 115 Such
a concern would appear especially salient with regard to conduct that
is lawful elsewhere. As Gore emphasized, "[t]o punish a person because
he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort."' 66 However, notice concerns logically
dissipate when conduct is unlawful in all or even most other jurisdic-
tions. 6 7 So, too, would federalism and comity concerns because no
sovereign policies face risk of contradiction. Moreover, while major
corporate actors were targeted in both cases, nothing in the Court's
decisions would preclude their application to noncorporate actors,
engaged in extraterritorial unlawful behavior of lesser geographic
dimension, facing a punitive damages claim.
Additionally, the State Farm majority was especially concerned about
"multiple punishments" being imposed on civil defendants engaged in
interstate commerce. Under such circumstances, consideration of extra-
territorial misconduct "creates the possibility of multiple punitive
damage awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties
are not bound by the judgment another plaintiff obtains."'68  In
addition, as tort reform advocates emphasize, such consideration can
effectively require mini-trials, leading to unreliable results and unfair
disadvantage to defendants.169
individual States from imposing burdens on interstate commerce. While each State has
ample power to protect its own consumers, none may use the punitive damages deterrent
as a means of imposing it regulatory policies on the entire Nation.
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559. 585 (1996).
165. If. at 570; see also id at 574 (stating that "[ejlementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutionaljurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the conduct that will subject him
to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose").
166. Id. at 573 n.9 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
167. Notably, the Court's concern contrasts with its noticejurisprudence regarding civil regulations
more generally, with its more lenient standards based on the notion that businesses can be expected to con-
form their conduct to relevant laws before acting. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494-95, 498 (1982); see also Gilliam K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness:
An Economic Perspective on Precision in theLaw, 82 CAL. L REV. 541,551-52 (1994) (drawing similar distinctions
between commercial and private actors in civil and criminal realms). In addition, it has long been recog-
nized that state tort law is marked by' a broad diversity of views on liability and damages, and that such
diversity is a central aspect of the federalist system in which businesses operate. See BetsyJ. Grey, Theije\
Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. RE.*%, 475, 513-18 (2002) (noting
variations).
168. State Farm Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003). Courts and commentators have
suggested independent means to address the multiple punishments problem, such as mandatingjury instruc-
tions that require consideration be given to prior punitive awards for the same course of conduct, and that
appellate courts factor such prior awards into excessiveness review. See Colby, supra note 122, at 660-61.
This is the approach favored by the Restatement. See RESTATEMEANF (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e
(1977).
169. See Sharkey, supra note 141, at 449 (noting concerns).
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The multiple punishments concern is longstanding and surely has
some validity. In the paradigmatic case of a defendant engaging in a
single wrongful act, resulting in injury to multiple plaintiffs (for example,
as a result of a defective, mass-produced product), obvious fairness con-
cerns arise-both for the defendant hit with successive punitive awards
and for injured parties who lose the "race to the courthouse" and
possibly are left with a judgment-proof defendant. 7 ' However, the
other misconduct at issue in State Farm involved misbehavior of a varied
nature over a twenty-year period, a key distinction.' 7 ' Moreover,
nothing in State Farm would appear to limit its rationale to "single act"
scenarios; indeed, its insistence on similarity would suggest the con-
trary. 1
72
These difficulties aside, there remains the differing sensitivity of the
Court to the matter of multiple punishments more generally in the civil
and criminal systems. Prior to the Court's October 2002 term, a degree
of symmetry existed between the two realms. A punitive damages
defendant was not to be "punished" for wrongs done elsewhere, but
such misbehavior could be considered in assessing "reprehensibility." '73
Similarly, a criminal recidivist was not to be punished again for prior
misdeeds, but a subsequent sentence could be "stiffened" as a result of
"aggravated," continued failure to adhere to the law (that is, more
"reprehensible" conduct, in punitive damages parlance).'74 State Farm,
170. Despite such concerns, at common law the specter of multiple awards for the same wrongful
behavior was not uniformly condemned. In 1917, for instance, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that "[t] his
is a situation that has often been met. The fact that a defendant has [been] or may be held liable for
exemplary damages in one case has never been held as a defense in his favor against liability for exemplary
damages in another case to another plaintiff." Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 294 (Iowa 1917).
Indeed, the first reported punitive damages cases involved multiple punishments for the same course of
conduct (with both awards being upheld). See Colby, supra note 122, at 629 n. 168 (citing Wilkes v. Wood,
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (cit. Cm. PI. 1763) and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763)), see also, e.g.,
Cathey v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting imposing of due
process limit on multiple awards); Greco v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F. Supp. 810, 817 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(same).
171. This misbehavior included, inter alia, fraudulent handling of first-party claims, hiding and
destruction of relevant corporate documents, and general mistreatment of claimants, including discrimina-
tion based on race, gender, economic status, educational background, and age. See Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1156 (Utah 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
172. To date the Court has addressed punitive damages challenges only in single-plaintiff cases,
despite the foremost concern expressed over the increasing number of mass tort claims garnering big puni-
tive awards and the consequent risk of multiple punishment. I thank Catherine Sharkey for drawing my
attention to this point.
173. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 n.21 (1996). Notably, the Utah trial court in State
Farm employed a bifurcated approach that limited the likelihood thatjurors would punish State Farm's past
deeds or practices. Phase I determined liability, while phase II, when evidence of extraterritorial
misconduct was adduced, addressed the availability of punitive damages. See State Farm, 65 P.3d at 1158.
174. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948). Moreover, as a result of the Court's "dual
sovereignty" doctrine, permitting successive prosecutions by different states for the same crime, repeated
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however, elided the subtle distinction advanced in Gore and largely
barred consideration of extraterritorial misconduct out of fairness
concerns. 75 Meanwhile, Ewing, with its predominant focus on criminal
history, rather than the menial nature of the offense triggering re-
offender status,'76 has exacerbated the growing concern that recidivist
laws violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
77
B. Varied Views of Culpability
A second major contrast that has emerged in the wake of Ewing and
State Farm concerns the distinct ways culpability is assessed in the review
of punitive damage awards and criminal sentences, a matter that hereto-
fore linked the two sanctions.'78 According to the Court, a punitive
damages award "imposed on a defendant should reflect the 'enormity
of his offense," 179 or "reprehensibiity,"8 0 and "the punishment should
fit the crime."18' Likewise, prison sentences must not be "grossly dispro-
portionate" to the offender's criminal culpability.'82 As State Farm and
Ewing make clear, however, this avowed symmetry is a thing of the past.
The Court has embarked on a path that employs distinctly different
frames of reference when evaluating culpability, the anchor point in the
proportionality analysis.
Historically, the justices have reasoned that criminal recidivist
enhancements arejustified in retributive terms because repeated wrong-
doing makes a defendant more culpable in the eyes of the law.'83 By
punishment for a single act does not violate the DoubleJeopardy Clause. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82 (1985).
175. State Farm Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422-23 (2003)-
176. For more on the significance ofEwing's emphasis on recidivist history in assessing proportionality
see infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
177. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 81 n.2 (2003) (Souter,J, dissenting) (observing that "[a]s
triggering offenses become increasingly minor and recidivist sentences grow, the sentences advance toward
doublejeopardy violations"); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,88 (1986) (expressing concern
that the "tail" of the sentencing fact might "wvag[] the dog of the substantive offense"). For arguments in
support of this point see Nathan H. Seltzer, Comment, Wien the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision Course
Between Recdivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U. L. REv. 921 (2003).
178. In the past, this parallel has figured prominently in the Court's reasoning in punitive damages
decisions, as evidenced in its citation to precedent addressing criminal sentence proportionality challenges.
See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Lcatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001) (citing Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) in support of Gore's reprehensibility guidepost).
179. BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (quoting Dayv. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1851)).
180. Id. at 575.
181. Id.at575n.24.
182. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288.
183. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Ofcourse, a compelling argument exists that Ewing
once and for all eviscerated the retributivejustification of recidivist laws insofaras Ewing's trifling triggering
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giving effect to the entire criminal history of offenders, the Court has
rebuffed ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges to recidivism-
enhanced sentences.' 84 In Ewing, the Court reemphasized that society
has an interest in "not merely punishing the offense of conviction, or the
'triggering offense,"' but "in addition the interest . . in dealing in a
harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown
that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as
established by its criminal law."' 8 5 However, whereas in the past the
Court adhered to the principle that a sentence can be "stiffened" due to
repeat offending, 8 6 yet remain tied to the "crime for which the
defendant has been convicted," '87 Ewing attributed far greater weight
to recidivism. After Ewing, a criminal defendant's history of offending,
rather than the seriousness of the triggering offense, has assumed
paramount importance for Eighth Amendment purposes.'88
State Farm, as noted earlier, highlights the Court's embrace of a much
narrower, misconduct-specific view when it comes to proportionality
review of punitive damages. A defendant is to "be punished for the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual
or business."' 89 The majority condemned the "award[ ] [of] punitive
damages to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the
[plaintiff's] harm," and held that "[a] defendant's dissimilar acts,
independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not
offense surely did not warrant the 'just desert" of a life term. See Michael Vitiello, California's Three Strikes
and We're Out WasJudidalActivism Californias Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1071-81 (2004).
However, as discussed infa, Ewing can also be read as embracing a broadened view of desert, taking to an
extreme the traditional view that criminal history enhances culpability and hence "desert" for sentencing
purposes.
184. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
185. Ewing -. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 296); see dso id (asserting
that in assessing proportionality courts "must place on the scales not only [an offender's] current felony,
but also his long history of felony recidivism").
186. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948).
187. Solm, 463 U.S. at 290; see also id. at 296 n.21 (stating that although "prior convictions are
relevant to the sentencingdecision," the Court "must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers
the life sentence-since [the defendant] already has paid the penalty for the each of his prior offenses");
cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (noting in proportionality review of capital sentence that
the defendant had "prior convictions for capital felonies.., but these prior convictions do not change the
fact that the instant crime ... is. .. rape not involving the taking of [a human] life").
188. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2004) (deciding, post-Ewing, that
petitioner's 25-year life sentence under California's three strikes law was an instance of the "extremely rare
case" of gross disproportionality, based on petitioner's minor offense history of shoplifting).
189. State Farm Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003); see also Kenneth S. Abraham &
John C. Jeffries,Jr., Punitive Danages and the Rul of Lamn: The Role ofDefendant's Wealth, 18J. LEGAL STUD.
415, 423 (1989) ("[P]unishment based on the characteristics of the actors, rather than on the specific
misconduct, threatens fundamental notions of fieedom forom governmental constraint.").
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serve as the basis for punitive damages."'1 90 The Court emphasized that
"in the context of ciMil actions courts must ensure the conduct in question
replicates the prior transgressions."'' Not just "any malfeasance,"
presumably even that properly adjudicated against a civil defendant in
a court of law (as opposed to a "hypothetical claim"), suffices.'92
By imposing such rigid requirements in State Farm, the Court again
has created a palpable contrast with the criminal law. While early laws
only targeted offenders who repeated specific crimes, today no such
exclusivity exists.'93 Jurisdictions are free to decide what kinds of
conduct-whether committed inside or outside thejurisdiction-can be
considered for sentence enhancement purposes. 9 ' As a result, unlike a
repeat offender convicted of analogous crimes, a tortfeasor found civilly
liable for a battery in one state, followed by a fraud in another state, 195
can likely rest easy that such extraterritorial misconduct will not be
considered because the torts did not "replicate" one another.' 96
In short, after State Farm punitive damages are to be viewed much
more as a private law remedy, in contrast to the avowedly "public
wrong" model predominant in recent times.'97 Punitive awards are now
taken to function, as Professor Richard Wright recently advocated, as
"private retribution for a discrete private dignitary injury," one distinct
from "any nondiscrete 'public wrong' that was caused to each member
190. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422-23.
191. Id. at 423 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 423-24. The Court's position on this important point is not as clear as one might like.
While insisting that the other misconduct "replicate[ I the prior transgression[ ]," and condemning
consideration of other misconduct that was not "similar" to the tortious third-party claim sued over, the
Court noted that the other misconduct "need not be identical." Id. at 423.
193. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
195. See THOMAS H. COHEN & STEVEN K. SMITH, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE,
CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001 6 (2004), at
http://wvw.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstrtct/ctcvlc0 l.htm (noting that in cases where punitive damages were
awarded plaintiffs 22% involved intentional torts and 17% fraud).
196. Although beyond the scope of discussion here, State Farm also can be interpreted to require that
other in-state misconduct "replicate" or be "similar" to that which injured the plaintiff. See State Fant, 538
U.S. at 422 (stating that "[a] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was
premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages"). Again, to the extent this is accurate, a basic
contrast is evident in the civil and criminal spheres: no such requirement exists when sentencing ci iminal
recidivists on the basis of prior in-state misconduct.
197. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In addition, as Professor Karlan has noted, the Court's
narrow view of culpable harm in the punitive damages realm is ironic in that it parallels itsjuiisprudence
on criminal forfeitures, wshich like Ewing entails interpretation ofthe Eighth Amendment. See Karlan, supra
note 124, at 900-01 (discussing United States v. Bajakain, 524 U.S. 321, 326,329 (1998), where the Court
concluded that an inpersonan criminal forfeiture was "grossly disproportionate" in light of the defendant's
"minimal level of culpability" in failing to report currency when leaving the country, an infraction that
merely deprived the government of information about a comparatively modest amount of money).
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of the community as a result of the same conduct."' 98 The conceptual
shift has been urged by scholars as being more consistent with the
historic role of punitive damages'99 and by tort reformers as a basis to
avoid providing "windfall[s]" to plaintiffs.200 However, to the extent
punitive awards function as "an expression of moral condemnation," '
with the apparent reconceptualization there must come a corresponding
change in the social meaning of punitive awards." 2 Whereas in Ewing
the Court adhered to (indeed amplified) the traditional denunciatory
view that regards the criminal wrongdoer notjust in terms of his last bad
act, but former ones as well, in State Farm the Court embraced a much
more atomistic view of tortfeasors' culpability.
20 3
198. Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and E'tent ofLegal Reuponsibilidy, 40 SAN DtEGO L. REV. 1425,
1431 (2003).
199. According to Professor Wright:
[u]nfortunately, in all but a few states ... the "private wrong" conception of punitive
damages in tort law has given way to a 'public wrong' conception, which views such
damages solely as a backstop to criminal law ... This conception has resulted in an
unprincipled law of punitive damage that is beset by a host ofconstitutional and theoretical
problems.
Id. at 1431 n. 19; see also Colby, supra note 122, at 674 (urging, before State Farm, recognition that "the
purpose of punitive damages is not to punish the defendant for its wrongful act, but rather to punish the
defendant for the wrong done, and the injury caused, to the plaintiff").
200. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twvisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensation into "Punishment," 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002).
201. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). Professor
Clarence Mortis long ago referred to this as the "admonitory" function of punitive damages. See Clarence
Morris, PunitieDamages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1206 (1931) ("The punitive damage doctrine
is evidence of an age-old feeling that the admonitory function is soetimces entided to moie emphasis than
it receives -when judgments in tort actions are limited to compensation."); see also, e.g., Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437,458 (Wis. 1980) (likening "stigma" associated with assessment of punitive
award to criminal liability).
202. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Aotes on Cognition and Valuation in Laai),
107 YALE LJ. 2071, 2074 (1998) ("[Punitive damages may have a retributive or expressive function,
designed to embody social outrage at the actions of serious wrongdoers."). For examples of the expansive
literature on social meaning and expressivism more generally see, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson &
Richard H. Pildes, Erpressive Theories ofLan: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000) and Cass
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). For discussion of social
mcaning and criminal sanctions in particular see, for example, Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Mleaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). Cf Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An EconomnicAnalysis of the
Cim inal Laze as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE LJ. 1, 23-24, 35-38 (discussing various ways in which
tort and criminal law contain "opportunity- and preference-shaping" methods to achieve compliance).
203. The approach is also reflected in the Court's treatmentofthe second Gore guidepost, concerning
the ratio between the compensatory award and the punitive damages assessed. In State Farm the majority
finally established that "few awards" in excess of a single-digit ratio will survive due process scrutiny. State
Farm Auto Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,425 (2003). However, linking proportionality to compensatory
damages is at odds with the retributive purpose of punitive awards. This is because "compensatory
damages reflect the plaintiffs injury, not the defendant's culpability; consequently, neither the
compensatory award, nor some multiple of it, necessarily bears any relation to the amount of punishment
a defendant deserves." Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence. The Role ofPuniti eDamages in Products
liability Litigation, 74 KY. LJ. 1, 58 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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Indeed, with its circumscribed view of culpability, tied most closely to
retribution, 20 4 and insistence on replication and similarity, State Farm
suggests that deterrence has become the preeminent justification for
punitive awards. With corporate actors such as State Farm, fictional
entities with no "soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked,"2 5 yet
(ideally) susceptible of being deterred by a warning not to commit
"similar" extraterritorial offenses,20 6 such a shift in rationale might make
sense in theoretical,2 7 if not practical,20 8 terms. However, it does not
diminish the existence of a now stark jurisprudential divide.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite punitive damages and criminal sentences being regarded as
twins separated at birth, the Court's recent decisions in State Farm v.
Campbell and Ewing v. Califria make clear that their kinship is now more
apparent than real. This is especially true with regard to how extra-
territorial wrongdoing is considered when assessing whether a punitive
award or criminal sentence properly reflects an actor's culpability. In
State Farm, the Court emphasized that "as a general rule" such miscon-
duct cannot be taken account of in "reprehensibility" determinations,
the paramount factor when assessing of whether an award satisfies due
process.20 9 In Ewing, the Court held that for all intents and purposes the
Eighth Amendment does not constrain criminal recidivist laws, which
204. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations ofPsnitie Damages, 4OALA. L. REV. 705, 712 (1989)
(stating that "[p]unitive damages thus serve to repay the offender's 'debts' to both the victim and society,
and so to restore the proper moral balance").
205. Edward, First Baron Thurlow, 1731-1806, quoted in MER\,YN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
CORPORATION 1 (1977).
206. For discussion of the arguments commonly made in favor of a deterrence-based approach to
addressing corporate criminal misconduct, see Wayne A. Logan, Ciminal I" &ctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. RENv. 321, 377-81 (2003).
207. See id. at 353-54, 359-60 (discussing anthropomorphic justification for corporate criminal
liability). As Professor Karlan has pointed out to me, we simply do not think of corporate entities as
"having character in the way that individuals do, so that the fact that a corporation once sold a shoddy
toaster seems unconnected intuitively to their now having manipulated their stock price, while the fact that
a guy graduated from burglary to armed robbery seems more continuous." E-mail correspondence from
Professor Pam Karlan to Professor Wayne Logan, Aug. 10, 2004 (on file with author).
208. Whether deterrence is ultimately served by the Court's approach is subject to dispute. This is
especially so relative to the second Goreguidepost-the ratio ofcompensatory to punitive damages awarded.
The Court's presumption of a single-digit multiplier raises the specter that tortfeasors will internalize
punitive awards as operating expenses. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523
(1984) (distinguishing prices, which are morally neutral and internalized as business cost, and sanctions,
which stigmatize and carry greater potential deterrent force).
209. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419, 421; see also Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 990 (Cal.
1978) (asserting with respect to punitive damages that "the more reprehensible the act, the greater the
appropriate punishment").
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freely rely upon past extraterritorial misconduct to enhance criminal
sentences. Together, the decisions leave in their wake ajustice system
that regards extraterritorial wrongs by civil defendants very differently
from that of their criminal counterparts, while nominally regarding the
former as worthy of "punitive" sanction.
To be sure, there exist distinct implications of imposing punitive
damages on a corporate civil defendant such as State Farm, which con-
ducts business nationwide, and enhancing the sentence of an individual
criminal recidivist such as Gary Ewing, whose activities are of more
modest geographic scope. The economic repercussions, in themselves,
might well counsel against a capacious view on extraterritoriality when
assessing punitive damages. Indeed, such repercussions were plainly of
major importance to the State Farm majority, which endorsed a due
process analysis strikingly similar to its Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence."' l However, the Court's critical scrutiny stands in
marked contrast to the blithe judicial acceptance of criminal recidivist
enhancements based on extraterritorial misconduct, despite palpable
double jeopardy concerns. Furthermore, nothing in State Farm appears
to limit its reasoning to large, multistate corporate defendants; the same
comity and federalism concerns expressed by the Court would logically
apply to punitive awards levied against individuals or corporations with
far lesser reach. As a result, for tortfeasors facing punitive awards,
unlike criminal defendants facing recidivism-based sentence
enhancements, the scope of wrongful conduct amenable to
consideration now effectively ends at the state line.
By circumscribing the scope of conduct permissibly considered in
punitive awards, State Farm plainly represents a major victory for tort
reformers, who have long fought to decouple punitive awards from
criminal sanctions.2" Ultimately, the Court's varied regard for the
210. The Dormant Commerce Clause "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that
takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,642-43 (1982). Even there, however, the Court has been at pains to
acknowledge the power of states to exert control in the name of the non-economic well being of their
residents. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) ("[The] distinction between the
power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health and safety and from fraud, even when
those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict the
flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history and our
law.").
211. Writing in 1965, for instance, one advocate asserted that ifa defendant's behavior qualified for
criminal conviction, then the defendant should be criminally prosecuted, but "[i]f the actions of the
defendant do not constitute acrime, he then simply should not suffer punishment." James Chiardi, ShouLd
PuntiveDamages Be Abolished?A Statement in the Affirmatize, 1965 ABA PROCEEDINGS, SEcTtON OFINSUR.,
NEGUGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 282, 288; see aiss SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 14, §
2.2(A)(2), at 30-31 (asserting that the criminal law, not the tort system, is best suited to serve society's need
to punish and deter misconduct); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Matthews, 14hy Punitive Damages are
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extraterritorial misconduct of punitive damage and criminal defendants
restores the formalistic divide in public and private law that originated
in the mid-nineteenth century, 12 which punitive damage awards have
long threatened.2" 3 In recent times, punitive damages have "occup[ied]
the no-man's land between the criminal law and the civil. '214 In the
wake of State Farm, this is far less so.
Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2004) (asserting that "the concept of punitive damages represents a
perverse transfer of what is inherently public power to private individuals ....").
212. See Horwitz, supra note 13, at 1425 (identifying divide and discussing asserted corrupting
influence of punitive damages).
213. Id. The view was expressed most memorably by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 1872:
"[The idea of punishment is wholly confined to the criminal law . . . What kind ofcivil remedy for the
plaintiffis the punishment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly
and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." Fayv. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,
382 (1872). "The true rule, simple and just, is to keep the civil and the criminal process and practice
distinct and separate." Id. at 397. For instances of less colorful but no less adamantjudicial opposition
from the same era see Iurphy t. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 121 (Colo. 1884) and Spokane Truck &Dray Co. v. Hoefer,
25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
214. Gail He riot, An Essy on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive Damages, 7J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL. ISSUES 43, 65 (1996); see also Ellis, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that punitive damages lie
"in the borderland that both bridges and separates criminal law and torts").

